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Translation of “Mathematiques et formalisme” by Jean Cavailles and
Georges Canguilhem; with introductions by two. Including a 1950 review
by Alonzo Church.
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Introduction : a forgotten hero of logic
and computer science
Jean Cavailles has a definite place within the philosophy and history of
computer science.
This is in addition to mathematics, where his situation is already guar-
anteed, and where he continues to be an object of regular attention.
This place he has won based on his writings, like “The School of Vienna
at Prague” :
As early as after the War, or at the latest then, his work’s significance
had not escaped the wider international community of computer scientists
– this was before “computer scientists” carried such a name and before
they could conceive of themselves in terms of a separate, fixed scientific
identity, let alone organized academic group.
In 1950, Alonzo Church wrote a review for “Mathematiques et formal-
isme”, which the reader will find here in a first or new translation under
the title “Mathematics and formalism” (Science in acts).
—
Cavailles’ influence on later generations of philosophers continues to
be seen everywhere in this text :
When reading Foucault’s flamboyant signature endings, one will know
from now on their ‘origins’ – if such an intellectual activity, the domain
and hunting grounds of doubly imprisoned and foolish “intellectual intel-
lectuals”, had any urgency (certainly not the one they give to it).
Meanwhile, when reading passages such as “the dangers of transposing
without critic methods of intuition, good for one specific domain”, we are
reminded of our own ‘gentle father’ (as Dante had said of Virgil).
Here are also found themes shared with his colleagues, Canguilhem
or Bachelard, or even Wittgenstein, such as the dangers of metaphors
and common language – their inherent vagueness and equivocal nature.
(Though he himself makes abundant use of them in his colorful language.)
In one passage, Canguilhem sees reminiscences of Cavailles’ war or
trench warfare experiences, but has he missed the other where Cavailles
writes that mathematics needed to blow up the the domain of what can
be numbered?
—
In this article Cavailles argues for the inclusion of logic within math-
ematical formalism while also highlighting its limits : a summary of its
rules, failed attempts, and a conclusion that is sure to make dream many
more of our generations.
Cavailles’ legacy – still in the process of being carved out – cannot be
ignored longer. To those who made the choice of dedicating their lives to
others we have a real obligation.
For they did so at the expense of their own.
They were selfless, and careless in the only way carelessness is virtuous.
Gabrielle1 returned from Fresnes alone; Cavailles’ mutilated body was
dumped in a hole.




We have found amongst the papers of Jean Cavailles the following
pages, obviously meant for publication; this we say based on the great
care given to its writing, leading to an exceptionally easy deciphering,
and the signature at the end. Unfortunately, we cannot assign any precise
date to this text. However, we think that a metaphor used by Cavailles –
“like a jump after being on the look out” – finds meaning in his experiences
of combat. This would place it in the intermediary period between the
publication of the 1938 theses and On the Logic and the Theory of Science
[Sur la Logique et la Theorie de la Science], written in 1942-1943 and
published since.
It is certain that, for one, the formulation ‘the history of mathematics
“is not a history”’ establishes a continuity with the fundamental themes
of “Axiomatic method and formalism” [“Methode axiomatique et formal-
isme”] while, on the other hand, the assertion “the development of the
whole of mathematics follows a necessary rhythm” announces the closing
lines of On the Logic and the Theory of Science where the dialectic of con-
cepts is restored in all of its importance at the expense of a philosophy of
conscience/consciousness [conscience], powerless in its inability to justify
the course of successive unpredictable events without being arbitrary.
The last formula [formule] of this paper will no doubt raise as many
problems of interpretation as the one that closes the [aforementioned]
posthumous work.
Returning from one of his travels to Belgium, where he had been orga-
nizer of groups and networks of Resistance, Cavailles had communicated
to us the project of Jean Lameere to resume publication of the Interna-
tional Review of Philosophy [Revue Internationale de Philosophie] as soon
as possible following the end of this conflict whose outcome, already then,
left no doubt neither for one, nor the other.
The approval given by Cavailles to this project justifies the publication
inside the Revue Internationale of a study that will, once more, be a





As soon as 1825, Gergonne distinguished between ‘concrete mathe-
matics’ and formal theory of operations relating to any objects.
But, the evolution of the XIXth century would tend to the removal
of the former at the benefit of the second : unexpected intersections, the
uncovering of new roads [or ways] showed already, through intended com-
parisons, just how equivocal [multivoque] the recourse to evidence was,
and, on the other hand, the dangers of transposing without critic meth-
ods of intuition, good for one specific domain (the differential treatments
of finite sums and infinite sums; the non-commutative nature of the mul-
tiplication of certain complex numbers). Hence the need to unify through
generalization rather than assimilation; to specify within the domain of
the sensible rather than to imagine : systematization and symbolism, the
two habitual medicines of the mathematician as soon as any difficulty ap-
pears, and on which novel theories are founded. Making use of it for the
entire edifice, transformed into an immense system of symbols, there is
nothing new to this : it is the old dream of panlogism.
It is indeed of importance to integrate logic within formalism. The
interruption of symbolic chaining by reasonings made ’in the clear’ would
render any preceding efforts vain : one single word, one intuitive jump in
thinking [of the thought], and as soon are reintroduced links to sensations
and notions of limited validity.
If mathematics is, as Frege and Dedekind said, but a part of logic,
the latter in turn cannot be anything else but mechanical play of symbols
: propositions and reasonings are returned to well defined and precise
materializations.
At its origins, we’ll establish a set of few and easily recognizable sym-
bols : parentheses, letters, etc., and some rules of usage that give them
meaning : the coming together [reunion] of certain signs in an order con-
forming to these rules will constitute a formula.
Lastly, certain formulas – or certain schemas, which is to say formulas
where blanks are left, fillable by signs belonging to predetermined cate-
gories – will be established as being fundamentally valid : they are the
axioms.
Rules will enable their combination and transformation so as to enable
new valid formulas : for example substitution rules that will enable to
replace in an axiom some signs with others, and implication rules thanks
to which – given two formulas of which the first has already been shown
valid, the second written after it, with the sign =⇒ between the two, will
constitute a valid expression, and rightfully we will be able to establish
the second as valid too.
Rules governing the use of these symbols, axioms, and rules of trans-
formation of formulas are of course not arbitrary, but chosen so as to
enable the translation of the most common intuitive reasonings : this will
be general logic.
(...)
But, two questions arise : Is it thus possible to engender all objects –
or system of objects – of historical mathematics? On the other hand, are
we certain that with sufficient axiomatic rules we would we not be able
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to construct formulas rejected by it?
(...)
[As for] the first problem, we are sent back to the negative solution of
Skolem. Let us suppose that all current mathematics might be inserted
into our formalism : it will thus become possible to write all of its axioms
one after the other (...) [But,] actual mathematics [la mathematique en
acte] forces us to blow up the domain of what can be numbered, it cannot
be submitted to a universal formalism. (...)
We cannot prove in an integral formalism the non-contradiction of
arithmetics : such was the result obtained by Godel, in a fashion [or
manner] analogous to that of Skolem.
(...)
As such the imperialism of XIXth century symbolism had concluded
on a double failure. As much as Hilbert had contributed to it, he never
claimed it (to be) complete.
(...)
Axiomatism, and the crisis of formalism have not been useless works.
They had contributed to rigor and purity of thought through the removal
of unwanted weeds [adventice]; and had enabled the establishment of un-
expected relationships and kinships between distinct disciplines.
(...)
A few some [Pas mal ] stairs are missing in this edifice still under
construction.
(...)
The failure of the simplistic attempt to reduce all of mathematics to
its poorest parent, combinatorics [le calul combinatoire], is proof enough.
No need to try out a more ambitious plan, like Cantor with his theory of
ensembles [set theory].
Mathematical activity is object of analysis and has an essence : but
like a fragrance or a sound, it is itself.
L’activite mathematique est object d’analyse et possede une essence :
mais comme une odeur ou comme un son, elle est elle-meme.
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The Journal of Symbolic Logic, Vol. 15, No. 2 (Jun., 1950).
JEAN CAVAILLES. Mathematiques et formalisme. Revue international
de philosophie (Brussels), vol. 3 (1949), pp. 158-165.
A posthumous fragment containing informal reflections of a general
nature about the formalization of mathematics, problems of Hilbertian
proof theory (especially those of consistency and completeness), and the
theorems of Godel (4183A). There is an introductory editorial note by
G. Canguilhem, and at the end is added a useful bibliography of publica-
tions by and about Cavailles. (See also the dedication of the number to
Cavailles, on page 157, signed by Jean Lameere.)
Alonzo Church
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